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GUIDE#5: architecture

Global History of Architecture

Living Architecture


Department of Architecture @M.I.T. /  МАРХИ

Struggle toward more important goals, of which the first would be to make each experience of my life classical, to endow it with a form, a cosmogony, a synthesis, and an eternal architecture.

Painting of the future will be classical, imperial, and existentialist. after the minimization it will become MAXIMIZED.

Painting is hand-done color photography of the superfine, extravagant, hyperaesthetic, virtual images of concrete irrationality (1929)

The individual can allow all the unformulated ideas of his subconscous o unfold into his consciousness. /the most rigorous systematization of phenomena and of the most delirious kind of material, with the intention of making most excessively dangerous ideas tangibly creative

Everything must be measured in advance occupations as well as the emotions ought to experience through them

YALE: Roman Architecture


Advanced Structural Analysis



The Beaubourg effect, the Beaubourg machine, the Beaubourg thing – how to give it a name? Enigma of this carcass of flux and signs, of networks and circuits – the final impulse to translate a structure that no longer has a name, the structure of social relations given over to superficial ventilation (animation, self-management, information, media) and to an irreversibly deep implosion. Monument to the games of mass simulation, the Pompidou Center functions as an incinerator absorbing all the cultural energy and devouring it – a bit like the black monolith in 2001: insane convection of all the contents that came there to be materialized, to be absorbed, and to be annihilated. All around, the neighborhood is nothing but a protective zone – remodeling, disinfection, a snobbish and hygienic design – but above all in a figurative sense: it is a machine for making emptiness. It is a bit like the real danger nuclear power stations pose: not lack of security, pollution, explosion, but a system of maximum security that radiates around them, the protective zone of control and deterrence that extends, slowly but surely, over the territory – a technical, ecological, economic, geopolitical glacis. What does the nuclear matter? The station is a matrix in which an absolute model of security is elaborated, which will encompass the whole social field, and which is fundamentally a model of deterrence (it is the same one that controls us globally, under the sign of peaceful coexistence and of the simulation of atomic danger).

The same model, with the same proportions, is elaborated at the Center: cultural fission, political deterrence.

This said, the circulation of fluids is unequal. Ventilation, cooling, electrical networks – the “traditional” fluids circulate there very well. Already the circulation of the human flux is less assured (the archaic solution of escalators in plastic sleeves, one ought to be aspirated, propelled, or something, but with a mobility that would be up to this baroque theatricality of fluids that is the source of the originality of the carcass). As for the material of the works, of objects, of books and the so-called polyvalent interior space, these no longer circulate at all. It is the opposite of Roissy, where from a futurist center of “spatial” design radiating toward “satellites,” etc., one ends up completely flat in front of . . . traditional airplanes. But the incoherence is the same. (What happened to money, this other fluid, what happened to its mode of circulation, of emulsion, of fallout at Beaubourg?)

Same contradiction even in the behavior of the personnel, assigned to the “polyvalent” space and without a private work space. On their feet and mobile, the people affect a cool demeanor, more supple, very contemporary, adapted to the “structure” of a “modern” space. Seated in their corner, which is precisely not one, they exhaust themselves secreting an artificial solitude, remaking their “bubble.” Therein is also a great tactic of deterrence: one condemns them to using all their energy in this individual defense. Curiously, one thus finds the same contradiction that characterizes the Beaubourg thing: a mobile exterior, commuting, cool and modern – an interior shriveled by the same old values.

This space of deterrence, articulated on the ideology of visibility, of transparency, of polyvalency, of consensus and contact, and sanctioned by the blackmail to security, is today, virtually, that of all social relations. All of social discourse is there, and on this level as well as on that of the treatment of culture, Beaubourg flagrantly contradicts its explicit objectives, a nice monument to our modernity. It is nice to think that the idea did not come to some revolutionary spirit, but to the logicians of the established order, deprived of all critical intelligence, and thus closer to the truth, capable, in their obstinacy, of putting in place a machine that is fundamentally uncontrollable, that in its very success escapes them, and that is the most exact reflection, even in its contradictions, of the current state of things.

Certainly, all the cultural contents of Beaubourg are anachronistic, because only an empty interior could correspond to this architectural envelope. The general impression being that everything here has come out of a coma, that everything wants to be animation and is only reanimation, and that this is good because culture is dead, a condition that Beaubourg admirably retraces, but in a dishonest fashion, whereas one should have triumphantly accepted this death and erected a monument or an anti-monument equivalent to the phallic inanity of the Eiffel Tower in its time. Monument to total disconnection, to hyperreality and to the implosion of culture-achieved today for us in the effect of transistorized circuits always threatened by a gigantic short circuit. Beaubourg is already an imperial compression – figure of a culture already crushed by its own weight – like moving automobiles suddenly frozen in a geometric solid. Like the cars of Caesar, survivors of an ideal accident, no longer external, but internal to the metallic and mechanical structure, and which would have produced tons of cubic scrap iron, where the chaos of tubes, levers, frames, of metal and human flesh inside is tailored to the geometric size of the smallest possible space – thus the culture of Beaubourg is ground, twisted, cut up, and pressed into its smallest simple elements – a bundle of defunct transmissions and metabolisms, frozen like a science-fiction mecanoid. But instead of breaking and compressing all culture here in this carcass that in any case has the appearance of a compression, instead of that, one exhibits Caesar there. One exhibits Dubuffet and the counterculture, whose inverse simulation acts as a referential for the defunct culture. In this carcass that could have served as a mausoleum to the useless operationality of signs, one reexhibits Tinguely’s ephemeral and autodestructive machines under the sign of the eternity of culture. Thus one neutralizes everything together: Tinguely is embalmed in the museal institution, Beaubourg falls back on its supposed artistic contents.

Fortunately, this whole simulacrum of cultural values is annihilated in advance by the external architecture.*1 Because this architecture, with its networks of tubes and the look it has of being an expo or world’s fair building, with its (calculated?) fragility deterring any traditional mentality or monumentality, overtly proclaims that our time will never again be that of duration, that our only temporality is that of the accelerated cycle and of recycling, that of the circuit and of the transit of fluids. Our only culture in the end is that of hydrocarbons, that of refining, cracking, breaking cultural molecules and of their recombination into synthesized products. This, the Beaubourg Museum wishes to conceal, but the Beaubourg cadaver proclaims. And this is what underlies the beauty of the cadaver and the failure of the interior spaces. In any case, the very ideology of “cultural production” is antithetical to all culture, as is that of visibility and of the polyvalent space: culture is a site of the secret, of seduction, of initiation, of a restrained and highly ritualized symbolic exchange. Nothing can be done about it. Too bad for the masses, too bad for Beaubourg.

What should, then, have been placed in Beaubourg?

Nothing. The void that would have signified the disappearance of any culture of meaning and aesthetic sentiment. But’this is still too romantic and destructive, this void would still have had value as a masterpiece of anticulture.

Perhaps revolving strobe lights and gyroscopic lights, striating the space, for which the crowd would have provided the moving base element?

In fact, Beaubourg illustrates very well that an order of simulacra only establishes itself on the alibi of the previous order. Here, a cadaver all in flux and surface connections gives itself as content a traditional culture of depth. An order of prior simulacra (that of meaning) furnishes the empty substance of a subsequent order, which, itself, no longer even knows the distinction between signifier and signified, nor between form and content.

The question: “What should have been placed in Beaubourg?” is thus absurd. It cannot be answered because the topical distinction between interior and exterior should no longer be posed. There lies our truth, the truth of Mobius-doubtless an unrealizable Utopia, but which Beaubourg still points to as right, to the degree to which any of its contents is a countermeaning and annihilated in advance by the form.

Yet-yet … if you had to have something in Beaubourg – it should have been a labyrinth, a combinatory, infinite library, an aleatory redistribution of destinies through games or lotteries – in short, the universe of Borges – or even the circular Ruins: the slowed-down enchainment of individuals dreamed up by each other (not a dreamworld Disneyland, a laboratory of practical fiction). An experimentation with all the different processes of representation: defraction, implosion, slow motion, aleatory linkage and decoupling – a bit like at the Exploratorium in San Francisco or in the novels of Philip K. Dick – in short a culture of simulation and of fascination, and not always one of production and meaning: this is what might be proposed that would not be a miserable anticulture. Is it possible? Not here, evidently. But this culture takes place elsewhere, everywhere, nowhere. From today, the only real cultural practice, that of the masses, ours (there is no longer a difference), is a manipulative, aleatory practice, a labyrinthine practice of signs, and one that no longer has any meaning.

In another way, however, it is not true that there is no coherence between form and content at Beaubourg. It is true if one gives any credence to the official cultural project. But exactly the opposite occurs there. Beaubourg is nothing but a huge effort to transmute this famous traditional culture of meaning into the aleatory order of signs, into an order of simulacra (the third) that is completely homogeneous with the flux and pipes of the facade. And it is in order to prepare the masses for this new semiurgic order that one brings them together here – with the opposite pretext of acculturating them to meaning and depth.

One must thus start with this axiom: Beaubourg is a monument of cultural deterrence. Within a museal scenario that only serves to keep up the humanist fiction of culture, it is a veritable fashioning of the death of culture that takes place, and it is a veritable cultural mourning for which the masses are joyously gathered.

And they throw themselves at it. There lies the supreme irony of Beaubourg: the masses throw themselves at it not because they salivate for that culture which they have been denied for centuries, but because they have for the first time the opportunity to massively participate in this great mourning of a culture that, in the end, they have always detested. The misunderstanding is therefore complete when one denounces Beaubourg as a cultural mystification of the masses. The masses, themselves, rush there to enjoy this execution, this dismemberment, this operational prostitution of a culture finally truly liquidated, including all counterculture that is nothing but its apotheosis. The masses rush toward Beaubourg as they rush toward disaster sites, with the same irresistible elan. Better: they are the disaster of Beaubourg. Their number, their stampede, their fascination, their itch to see everything is objectively a deadly and catastrophic behavior for the whole undertaking. Not only does their weight put the building in danger, but their adhesion, their curiosity annihilates the very contents of this culture of animation. This rush can no longer be measured against what was proposed as the cultural objective, it is its radical negation, in both its excess and success. It is thus the masses who assume the role of catastrophic agent in this structure of catastrophe, it is the masses themselves who put an end to mass culture.

Circulating in the space of transparency, the masses are certainly converted into flux, but at the same time, through their opacity and inertia, they put an end to this “polyvalent” space. One invites the masses to participate, to simulate, to play with the models – they go one better: they participate and manipulate so well that they efface all the meaning one wants to give to the operation and put the very infrastructure of the edifice in danger. Thus, always a sort of parody, a hypersimulation in response to cultural simulation, transforms the masses, who should only be the livestock of culture, into the agents of the execution of this culture, of which Beaubourg was only the shameful incarnation. One must applaud this success of cultural deterrence. All the antiartists, leftists, and those who hold culture in contempt have never even gotten close to approaching the dissuassive efficacy of this monumental black hole that is Beaubourg. It is a truly revolutionary operation, precisely because it is involuntary, insane and uncontrolled, whereas any operation meant to put an end to culture only serves, as one knows, to resurrect it.

To tell the truth, the only content of Beaubourg is the masses themselves, whom the building treats like a converter, like a black box, or, in terms of input-output, just like a refinery handles petroleum products or a flood of unprocessed material. It has never been so clear that the content – here, culture, elsewhere, information or commodities – is nothing but the phantom support for the operation of the medium itself, whose function is always to induce mass, to produce a homogeneous human and mental flux. An immense to-and-fro movement similar to that of suburban commuters, absorbed and ejected at fixed times by their workplace. And it is precisely work that is at issue here – a work of testing, polling, and directed interrogation: the people come here to select objects – responses to all the questions they might ask themselves, or rather they come themselves in response to the functional and directed question that the objects constitute. More than a chain of work it is thus a question of a programmatic discipline whose constraints have been effaced behind a veneer of tolerance. Well beyond traditional institutions of capital, the hypermarket, or the Beaubourg “hypermarket of culture,” is already the model of all future forms of controlled socialization: retotalization in a homogeneous space – time of all the dispersed functions of the body and of social life (work, leisure, media culture), retranscription of all the contradictory currents in terms of integrated circuits. Space-time of a whole operational simulation of social life. For that, the mass of consumers must be equivalent or homologous to the mass of products. It is the confrontation and the fusion of these two masses that occurs in the hypermarket as it does at Beaubourg, and that makes of them something very different from the traditional sites of culture (monuments, museums, galleries, libraries, community arts centers, etc.). Here a critical mass beyond which the commodity becomes hypercommodity and culture hyperculture, is elaborated – that is to say no longer linked to distinct exchanges or determined needs, but to a kind of total descriptive universe, or integrated circuit that implosion traverses through and through – incessant circulation of choices, readings, references, marks, decoding. Here cultural objects, as elsewhere the objects of consumption, have no other end than to maintain you in a state of mass integration, of transistorized flux, of a magnetized molecule. It is what one comes to learn in a hypermarket: hyperreality of the commodity – it is what one comes to learn at Beaubourg: the hyperreality of culture.

Already with the traditional museum this cutting up, this regrouping, this interference of all cultures, this unconditional aestheticization that constitutes the hyperreality of culture begins, but the museum is still a memory. Never, as it did here, has culture lost its memory in the service of stockpiling and functional redistribution. And this translates a more general fact: that throughout the “civilized” world the construction of stockpiles of objects has brought with it the complementary process of stockpiles of people – the line, waiting, traffic jams, concentration, the camp. That is “mass production,” not in the sense of a massive production or for use by the masses, but the production of the masses. The masses as the final product of all sociality, and, at the same time, as putting an end to sociality, because these masses that one wants us to believe are the social, are on the contrary the site of the implosion of the social. The masses are the increasingly dense sphere in which the whole social comes to be imploded, and to be devoured in an uninterrupted process of simulation.

Whence this concave mirror: it is from seeing the masses in the interior that the masses will be tempted to rush in. Typical marketing method: the whole ideology of transparency here takes on its meaning. Or again: it is in staging a reduced ideal model that one hopes for an accelerated gravitation, an automatic agglutination of culture as an automatic agglomeration of the masses. Same process: nuclear operation of a chain reaction, or specular operation of white magic.

Thus for the first time, Beaubourg is at the level of culture what the hypermarket is at the level of the commodity: the perfect circulatory operator, the demonstration of anything (commodity, culture, crowd, compressed air) through its own accelerated circulation. But if the supply of objects brings along with it the stockpiling of men, the latent violence in the supply of objects brings with it the inverse violence of men. Every stock is violent, and there is a specific violence in any mass of men also, because of the fact that it implodes – a violence proper to its gravitation, to its densification around its own locus of inertia. The masses are a locus of inertia and through that a locus of a completely new, inexplicable violence different from explosive violence. Critical mass, implosive mass. Beyond thirty thousand it poses the risk of “bending” the structure of Beaubourg. If the masses magnetized by the structure become a destructive variable of the structure itself – if those who conceived of the project wanted this (but how to hope for this?), if they thus programmed the chance of putting an end with one blow to both architecture and culture – then Beaubourg constitutes the most audacious object and the most successful happening of the century!

Make Beaubourg bend! New motto of a revolutionary order. Useless to set fire to it, useless to contest it. Do it! It is the best way of destroying it. The success of Beaubourg is no longer a mystery: the people go there for that, they throw themselves on this building, whose fragility already breathes catastrophe, with the single goal of making it bend. Certainly they obey the imperative of deterrence: one gives them an object to consume, a culture to devour, an edifice to manipulate. But at the same time they expressly aim, and without knowing it, at this annihilation. The onslaught is the only act the masses can produce as such – a projectile mass that challenges the edifice of mass culture, that wittly replies with its weight (that is to say with the characteristic most deprived of meaning, the stupidest, the least cultural one they possess) to the challenge of culturality thrown at it by Beaubourg. To the challenge of mass acculturation to a sterilized culture, the masses respond with a destructive irruption, which is prolonged in a brutal manipulation. To mental deterrence the masses respond with a direct physical deterrence. It is their own challenge. Their ruse, which is to respond in the very terms by which they are solicited, but beyond that, to respond to the simulation in which one imprisions them with an enthusiastic social process that surpasses the objectives of the former and acts as a destructive hypersimulation.*2

People have the desire to take everything, to pillage everything, to swallow everything, to manipulate everything. Seeing, deciphering, learning does not touch them. The only massive affect is that of manipulation. The organizers (and the artists and intellectuals) are frightened by this uncontrollable watchfulness, because they never count on anything but the apprenticeship of the masses to the spectacle of culture. They never count on this active, destructive fascination, a brutal and original response to the gift of an incomprehensible culture, an attraction that has all the characteristics of breaking and entering and of the violation of a sanctuary.

Beaubourg could have or should have disappeared the day after the inauguration, dismantled and kidnapped by the crowd, which would have been the only possible response to the absurd challenge of the transparency and democracy of culture – each person taking away a fetishized bolt of this culture itself fetishized.

The people come to touch, they look as if they were touching, their gaze is only an aspect of tactile manipulation. It is certainly a question of a tactile universe, no longer a visual or discursive one, and the people are directly implicated in a process: to manipulate/to be manipulated, to ventilate/to be ventilated, to circulate/to make circulate, which is no longer of the order of representation, nor of distance, nor of reflection. It is something that is part of panic, and of a world in panic.

Panic in slow motion, no external variable. It is the violence internal to a saturated ensemble. Implosion.

Beaubourg cannot even burn, everything is foreseen. Fire, explosion, destruction are no longer the imaginary alternative to this type of building. It is implosion that is the form of abolishing the “quaternary” world, both cybernetic and combinatory. Subversion, violent destruction is what corresponds to a mode of production. To a universe of networks, of combinatory theory, and of flow correspond reversal and implosion.

The same for institutions, the state, power, etc. The dream of seeing all that explode by dint of contradictions is precisely nothing but a dream. What is produced in reality is that the institutions implode of themselves, by dint of ramifications, feedback, overdeveloped control circuits. Power implodes, this is its current mode of disappearance. Such is the case for the city. Fires, war, plague, revolutions, criminal marginality, catastrophes: the whole problematic of the anticity, of the negativity internal or external to the city, has some archaic relation to its true mode of annihilation.

Even the scenario of the underground city – the Chinese version of the burial of structures – is naive. The city does not repeat itself any longer according to a schema of reproduction still dependent on the general schema of production, or according to a schema of resemblance still dependent on a schema of representation. (That is how one still restored after the Second World War.) The city no longer revives, even deep down – it is remade starting from a sort of genetic code that makes it possible to repeat it indefinitely starting with an accumulated cybernetic memory. Gone even the Borgesian Utopia, of the map coextensive with the territory and doubling it in its entirety: today the simulacrum no longer goes by way of the double and of duplication, but by way of genetic miniaturization. End of representation and implosion, there also, of the whole space in an infinitesimal memory, which forgets nothing, and which belongs to no one. Simulation of an immanent, increasingly dense, irreversible order, one that is potentially saturated and that will never again witness the liberating explosion.

We were a culture of liberating violence (rationality). Whether it be that of capital, of the liberation of productive forces, of the irreversible extension of the field of reason and of the field of value, of the conquered and colonized space including the universal – whether it be that of the revolution, which anticipates the future forms of the social and of the energy of the social – the schema is the same: that of an expanding sphere, whether through slow or violent phases, that of a liberated energy – the imaginary of radiation. The violence that accompanies it is that of a wider world: it is that of production. This violence is dialectical, energetic, cathartic. It is the one we have learned to analyze and that is familiar to us: that which traces the paths of the social and which leads to the saturation of the whole field of the social. It is a violence that is determined, analytical, liberating.

A whole other violence appears today, which we no longer know how to analyze, because it escapes the traditional schema of explosive violence: implosive violence that no longer results from the extension of a system, but from its saturation and its retraction, as is the case for physical stellar systems. A violence that follows an inordinate densifkation of the social, the state of an overregulated system, a network (of knowledge, information, power) that is overencumbered, and of a hypertrophic control investing all the interstitial pathways.

This violence is unintelligible to us because our whole imaginary has as its axis the logic of expanding systems. It is indecipherable because undetermined. Perhaps it no longer even comes from the schema of indeterminacy. Because the aleatory models that have taken over from classical models of determination and causality are not fundamentally different. They translate the passage of defined systems of expansion to systems of production and expansion on all levels – in a star or in a rhizome, it doesn’t matter – all the philosophies of the release of energy, of the irradiation of intensities and of the molecularization of desire go in the same direction, that of a saturation as far as the interstitial and the infinity of networks. The difference from the molar to the molecular is only a modulation, the last perhaps, in the fundamental energetic process of expanding systems.

Something else if we move from a millennial phase of the liberation and disconnection of energies to a phase of implosion, after a kind of maximum radiation (see Bataille’s concepts of loss and expenditure in this sense, and the solar myth of an inexhaustible radiation, on which he founds his sumptuary anthropology: it is the last explosive and radiating myth of our philosophy, the last fire of artifice of a fundamentally general economy, but this no longer has any meaning for us), to a phase of the reversion of the social – gigantic reversion of a field once the point of saturation is reached. The stellar systems also do not cease to exist once their radiating energy is dissipated: they implode according to a process that is at first slow, and then progressively accelerates – they contract at a fabulous speed, and become involutive systems, which absorb all the surrounding energies, so that they become black holes where the world as we know it, as radiation and indefinite energy potential, is abolished.

Perhaps the great metropolises – certainly these if this hypothesis has any meaning – have become sites of implosion in this sense, sites of the absorption and reabsorption of the social itself whose golden age, contemporaneous with the double concept of capital and revolution, is doubtless past. The social involutes slowly or brutally, in a field of inertia, which already envelops the political. (The opposite energy?) One must stop oneself from taking implosion for a negative process -inert, regressive – like the one language imposes on us by exalting the opposite terms of evolution, of revolution. Implosion is a process specific to incalculable consequences. May 1968 was without a doubt the first implosive episode, that is to say contrary to its rewriting in terms of revolutionary prosopopeia, a first violent reaction to the saturation of the social, a retraction, a challenge to the hegemony of the social, in contradiction, moreover, to the ideology of the participants themselves, who thought they were going further into the social – such is the imaginary that still dominates us – and moreover a good part of the events of 1968 were still able to come from that revolutionary dynamic and explosive violence, but something else began at the same time there: the violent involution of the social, determined on that score, and the consecutive and sudden implosion of power, in a brief moment of time, but that never stopped afterward – fundamentally it is that which continues, the implosion, of the social, of institutions, of power – and not at all an unlocatable revolutionary dynamic. On the contrary, revolution itself, the idea of revolution also implodes, and this implosion carries weightier consequences than the revolution itself.

Certainly, since 1968, and thanks to 1968, the social, like the desert, grows-participation, management, generalized self-management, etc. – but at the same time it comes close in multiple places, more numerous than in 1968, to its disaffection and to its total reversion. Slow seism, intelligible to historical reason

1. Technology: the desire for presence
       1.1. What is technology?
1.2. Technological desire for presence.
1.3. An ‘erotic core’ of technology?
1.4. Technological media: beyond the conscious intentions of man
1.5. Technologies as media for simulating the real and regaining enjoyment
2. Philosophy: the metaphysics of presence
2.1. Nostalgia: an analogue desire
2.2. Platonism
2.3. Modern subjectivity: the analogous representation of the world
3. Psychoanalysis: the mediation of presence
3.1. The ‘gap’ in the analogical mind
3.2.”You can’t have One without the Other”
3.3. Eros as Thanathos: Beauty as a mediator
3.4. Lacanian anthropology: beyond the need
3.5. Law and fantasy: the object a as surplus-enjoyment
3.6. Fantasy and surplus-enjoyment: between pleasure and jouissance
1. Introduction to the question of virtuality
1.1 What is virtuality: historical overview
1.2. Computer virtual reality
1.3. The real and the virtual in digital technologies: four models
2. Virtualization: from Lévy to Lacan
2.1. Characteristics of virtualization
2.2. Forces of virtualization: language, ‘law’, and technology
2.3. Language: the virtualization of the real  
2.3.1. The retroaction of ‘real time’
2.4. ‘Law’: the virtualization of ‘natural forces’
3. Interface technologies and the virtualization of the real
3.1. Technological fiction: invocational media
3.2. The digital revolution: from analogue to digital representations, from object to interface
3.3. Digitization and the mind’s schemes of representation
3.4. Computer virtual reality: from insight to liberation?
4. Interface technologies and the question of representation
4.1. Spaces of representation, or simulated spaces?
4.2. ‘On the interface of it, it seems impracticable to link sign and referent’
4.3. A mediamatic elimination of human subjectivity?  From Vorstellung to Darstellung?
4.4. Cyber-subjectivism or cyber-objectivism?
4.5. From semiotics to the subject as a mediating window
1. Fantasy as design
1.1. Design displays the central role of fantasy
1.2. The design of technological presence by means of metaphors
2. Fantasy: either ‘natural’ or ‘artificial’?
2.1. Freudian theory: fantasy appears as a ‘natural’ mediation
2.2. Fantasy as imitation: hallucinatory wishfullfilment
3. Fantasy at the interface: windows of perception
3.1. Fantasy: from lure to the condition of reality
3.2. Kantian theory: mediating sensations and reality
3.3. Freudo-Lacanian theory: desirable reality
3.3.1. Psychotherapy: transforming, not eliminating, fantasy
4. Origins of interface subjectivity
4.1. Historical sketch of the notion fantasy:  between perception and understanding
4.2. The (unconscious) productive imagination: from Kant to Freud
4.3. The origins of Freudian theory: psychical reality and the real as fantasmatic
4.4. Fantasy in Freudian psychoanalysis: beyond the opposition of  reality and illusion
5. Fantasy: the model of subjectivation
5.1. The double bind of fantasmatic identification
5.2. The computerized Self: appearance or illusion?
1. Technology and the real
1.1. Technè and tuchè: the pleasure principle and its beyond
1.2. The encounter with the real
1.3. A historical outline of the real in Lacan’s work
1.4. The real as the object of lost gratifications
1.5. Every man has his cross to bear: the real loss as trauma
1.6. Tuchè animates technè: the two-fold relation to the real of defense  and disclosure
2. The fantasy-interface as a mirror-screen
2.1. The screen and the shield
2.2. The screen as principally defensive: phobia, and its computerized treatment
3. The fantasy-interface as a window
3.1. The scheme of the veil
3.2. The unconscious fantasy
3.3. ‘Interactivity’: the screen as a window or frame
3.4. The interactive fantasy: the Self and the question of the Other
3.5. The screen and the other: computer psychotherapy
1. The ‘steersman’ and his body
1.1. Wiener and Lacan: the logic of cyborgs
1.2. Information codes and embodiment
1.2.1 Cybernetics
1.2.2. Cyberspace
2. Embodied space
2.1. The quest(ion) of space
2.2. Mirror space: the ego as a virtual unity
2.3. The optics of reflected figures: consciousness as an effect
2.4. Imaginary space interfaces man and world
2.5. Imaginary space: projecting sensations at/as the surface of the body
2.6. Avatars: engaging the body in space
2.7. Fascination: the double bind of occupying virtual space
3. Cyborg subjectivity
3.1. Emotions: a surface- and superficial thing?
3.2. Between deficiency and perfection: the never-ending promise of the cyborg
3.3. The excess of the cyborg: annihilating the threat of the real
3.4. Between exploring and dominating space
4. Third wave cybernetics
4.1 A Lacanian third wave cybernetics?
4.2. Incorporating the virtual surfaces
1. Objects of enjoyment
1.1. Techno-fetishism
1.2. The reality of pleasure: surplus-enjoyment
1.3. The perverse enjoyment of media: not the act, but the scene
1.4. The vital disavowal
1.5. Interpassivity and the technological belief
1.6. Theoretical foundations of the transition from narrative to audio-visual  culture
1.6.1. The sinthome: the glory of the mark
1.6.2. The partial objects and the cut
2. Subjectivized fantasy: identifying oneself as an object
2.1. Subjectivation: the subject as an object
2.2. Lifestyles
2.2.1. The sinthome and the body
2.2.2. The passion of the eye and the ear: ‘Encore!’
2.3. Symbols, information and commitment
2.4. Ideological interpellation in an age of information
2.5. Real identifications?
2.6. The (cyber) fantasy beyond subjectivation: false liberation
2.7. The body and the scene: subjectivity at the interface of meatspace and  cyberspace
1. The Cartesian subject of representation
1.1. Descartes, causality and imagination
1.2. The mind screening reality: Cartesian perspectivism
2. Lacan: fantasy as the ‘real stuff’ of the Cartesian subject
2.1. Lacan beyond Cartesian dualism: Cogito and libido
2.2. The unconscious (virtual) subject as a partial perspective upon the world
2.3. Fantasy as the stuff of the point of view
2.4. Lacan’s logic of visual representation
3. Fantasy as a scheme
3.1. Kant: schematism as a ‘hidden art in the depths of the human soul’
3.2. Freud on fantasy as a scheme
3.3. Lacan: fantasy as the scheme of desire
APPENDIX. Semiotics: towards the referent as a form
201. Introduction
201. ‘Mentalese’: meaning as an object in the mind
202. Ferdinand De Saussure: meaning is dependent on the sign
204. Lacan’s sequel to De Saussure
205. Summary. Three positions on the relation between sign and referent: idealism,  realism, and constructivism

Reference material

Communication Protocols and Internet Architectures (Lecture-1 vid)


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